And Lincoln thought he had the mechanism to do just that. He could compensate slaveholders for each of their slaves, using federal money to effectively buy slaves' freedom.
Though modern-day analyses from historians, economists, and journalists-such as Ta-Nehisi
Coates' discerning polemic on this very issue 2 -outline the economic and social impossibility of compensated emancipation at the time of the Civil War, Lincoln was convinced that he could make it work. He just needed a place to try it.
In 1861, Lincoln's options for testing out his compensated emancipation plan were limited to the four slave states that had not seceded (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri) or the District of Columbia. 3 Of these, he felt that Delaware stood the best chance of passing a compensated emancipation act, based on the simple fact that it had the least slaves within its borders. In a letter to Senator James A. McDougall on March 14, 1862, Lincoln explained that the 1860 Census counted 1798 slaves in Delaware, so "less than one half-day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at four hundred dollars per head." 4 He calculated that emancipating all 432,622 slaves in the four states plus D.C. would add up to the cost of eighty-seven days of the war. "Do you doubt," he asked McDougall, "that taking the initiatory steps on the part of those states and this District would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?" 5 To Lincoln, the plan was an obvious, smart choice, and it would all work if he could prove its efficacy in Delaware. April 1862. The president moved on and looked into a way to tackle the slavery issue from another angle, announcing the Emancipation Proclamation the next year, and his efforts for compensated emancipation have been largely overshadowed in history by his more famous executive order of 1863. But Lincoln got something right about his compensated emancipation plan: Delaware was a proving ground. And as a proving ground, Delaware has done more than simply signal that the border states were not going to go for compensated emancipation.
In this paper, I will explore the question of slavery in Delaware, a place where the peculiar institution died not with the bang of the Thirteenth Amendment, but instead with a quiet whimper through the antebellum years. I will draw especially upon the excellent (but relatively sparsely-cited) research of historians William H. Williams and Patience Essah, whose monographs on slavery in Delaware were both published in 1996, but my study has also been informed by various other secondary materials and a particularly incisive letter penned in 1837. I intend to offer a synoptic but insightful look into the factors that led to the curious decline of 6 William H. Williams, Slavery and Freedom in Delaware, 1639 -1865 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1996 , 175. Conversely, wheat, once planted, could essentially be left alone until it was fully grown; corn, while a degree less straightforward than wheat, was still not nearly as labor-intensive as tobacco. 17 Once Delaware farmers turned to wheat and corn, they realized that it was economically advantageous to seek hired help for the few busy weeks of the growing season, as opposed to making a year-round, long-term investment in a group of slaves who would be working at full capacity for only a fraction of each year. 18 In this way, slaves in Delaware became in many cases an economic burden rather than a benefit, so-for reasons that had everything to do to the bottom line and nothing to do with morality-Delaware slaveholders reconsidered their holdings. The rate of manumissions (which had occurred with some regularity in Delaware since the 1740s, when the colony's smallest farmers began to be squeezed out of the tobacco business) increased dramatically: while seventy percent of Delaware's African keen as they usually were to take a page from their successful Virginian counterparts, to overwhelmingly decide to manumit rather than to sell their slaves?
The answer can be found in a number of moral factors stemming from the influence of abolitionist groups and religious factions in the post-Revolution years. Adding fuel to the fire in a city like Wilmington was the fear and animosity with which Delaware's reality, of a dwindling institution of slavery but a persistent strand of virulent racism, was the crucible in which the Delaware black codes were forged. This series of laws to institutionally marginalize and repress African Americans began via decentralized legislation throughout the early 1800s, taking hold as a form of race-based social control as more blacks were manumitted. An 1826 law, for example, "mandated that free blacks carry passes" attesting to their freedom 46 -even in New Castle County, where slavery was virtually nonexistent. Essah argues that the very act of forcing African Americans to carry this pass "defined free blacks as an 'other,' a class inherently unequal to whites." 47 The otherization of African Americans existed as a symbolic alternative to slavery, a channel for discrimination in an age in which the institution of slavery was unpopular.
Restrictive racial legislation in Delaware gained its greatest force and traction in the wake of Nat Turner's insurrection in Virginia in August 1831, which sparked widespread paranoia amongst whites (even those who did not own slaves). 48 In October, there were whispers in Seaford, Sussex County, of a potential slave uprising-which turned out to be a group of white men in blackface playing a racist trick on the town. 49 This hoax, in the fear it provoked in whites who believed the rumors, reified statewide paranoia about a black revolt, and in 1832 the state assembly passed its first full-force black code. This code included laws requiring African
Americans to obtain a (nearly impossible to acquire) license before purchasing a firearm, setting perpetual bondage." 60 Yates revealed, then, how a law which was neutral in its letter could become weaponized against African Americans in its implementation. Thus, the specious appearance of legal equality 61 allowed for highly discriminatory practices-the heart of the black codes-to occur in actuality. And so, though slavery had fallen out of widespread practice in Delaware, its tenets of racial oppression gained new life through the black codes.
Conclusion: The Legacy of What Yates Saw
In the final paragraphs of his letter, Yates expressed in no uncertain terms the dire stakes of the sociopolitical climate in Delaware: "Delaware is a most critical ground in the contest now waging between liberty and slavery, between light and darkness." 62 Delaware, thought Yates, had the capacity to change its policies for the better and guide states to its south into the light, but it was also at risk of staying the course and keeping the South enshrouded in darkness. In fact,
Yates' analysis might have been more prescient than even he knew: the First State was such a "critical ground" because it was-as Lincoln would notice for different reasons twenty-five years later-a proving ground. Delaware, where slavery had essentially died out due to internal factors, would set the example for how a slavery-friendly state could respond to the end of the peculiar institution.
Regrettably, Delaware did not take the advice of Yates, who entreated the state to "substitute kindness, liberality and encouragement, in the place of oppression, contempt and 60 Yates, 212. 61 Although, in 1839, state assembly dispensed with the pretense of neutrality and officially expressed that whites convicted of stealing, unlike blacks, could not be sold into servitude (Williams, Slavery and Freedom, 193) . 62 Yates, "Slavery," 215. The laws that served to land these African Americans in prison-the laws that contributed to a vicious cycle of black servitude and economic immobility for nearly a century after the de jure end of slavery-were chillingly similar to some of the black code laws passed in places such as antebellum Delaware. Vagrancy, described by Blackmon as "the offense of a person not being able to prove at a given moment that he or she is employed," 65 was enough to condemn someone in Alabama to convict labor-provided that that someone was black. Well into the 1900s, vagrancy was "capriciously enforced," and, even in times of "massive unemployment among all southern men, was reserved almost exclusively for black men."
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Vagrancy, then, and in turn the crux of Southern convict labor, was the ideological heir to a piece of legislation like Delaware's larceny law, to Delaware's system-sometimes explicit, sometimes tacit-of disempowering free African Americans and even selling them into (or back into) servitude.
And this, therefore, is the legacy of that overlooked patch of land not quite 2000 square miles in size, of that strip of soil that changed hands from the Swedish to the Dutch to the English, of the First State, of the Quaker outpost, of the tiny border state, of the home of the Big Quarterly, of Yates' "critical ground," of the shining example that Lincoln hoped for but never received. This, therefore, is the legacy of the proving ground.
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